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Recent Decisions
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-
GovERzWNT's POWER OVER ALTN EXCLUSION
Menzei resided in the United States for twenty-five years as a
resident alien. In 1948 he made a trip to Europe, returning to New
York in 1950 with a quota immigration visa. There he was excluded
by order of the Attorney General without a hearing on the basis
of "confidential information, the disclosure of which would be
prejudicial to the public interest." The administrative action was
authorized by emergency regulations promulgated pursuant to the
Passport Act of 1918, 8 CODE FED. REG. § 175.53, § 175.57 (1949),
ratified by Presidential Proclamation. No. 2850, 14 FED. REG. 5173
(1949), U.S. Code Cong. Service 1949, p. 2618. All efforts to deport
him having failed, Menzei sought release through habeas corpus
proceedings claiming unlawful confinement on Ellis Island. The
district court sustained the writ. 101 F. Supp. 66 (1951). Con-
ceding the validity of the exclusion order, the court felt further
detention after twenty-one months justifiable only by positive
proof of Menzei's danger to the public safety. As the government
declined to divulge its evidence, even in camera, the court directed
respondent's conditional parole on bond. The court of appeals af-
firmed as to respondent's release and reversed as to conditions of
parole. 195 F. 2d 964 (2nd. Cir. 1952). The Supreme Court held
that Menzei's continued exclusion without a hearing, as a security
risk, did not deprive him of any statutory or constitutional right
even though the result was indefinite detention. Justices Black,
Jakcson, Frankfurter and Douglas dissented. Shaughnessy v. United
States ex rel Menzei. 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
Respondent's prior residence in this country cannot transform
his case into anything more than an exclusion proceeding. For
purposes of immigration, re-entry after absence equates with
original entry. Lapina v. Williams, 232 U.S. 78 (1914). And indefi-
nite harborage at Ellis Island cannot be construed as an entry.
Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228 (1925).
Treated as an original entrant, Menzei cannot dispute the
Government's right to define categories of aliens whose entry is
deemed prejudicial to the United States. Courts have long paid
deference to the sovereign power of the political departments of
government to expel or exclude aliens. Chae Chan Ping v. U.S.,
130 U.S. 581 (1889). Substantive due process requires only a rea-
sonable policy under particular conditions, especially where matters
of security are concerned. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580
(1952). Absence of judicial review of ex parte administrative action
placing an alien within a proscribed category has recently been
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sustained as not offending substantive due process. U.S. ex rel
Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
Respondent protests here only because such administrative
action will result in indefinite confinement. This factor of virtual
imprisonment would seem to present an even stronger argument
for judicial re-examination than did the facts in the Knauff case.
However, the Court's majority opinion follows the course of the
prior decision and reflects a confusion similar to that shown in the
Knauff case, supra, as to the various functions which courts are
called upon to play in the drama of government.
Only Mr. Justice Jackson in his dissent draws any distinction
between the three types of judicial review which might be ap-
plicable here: review of administrative action in terms of sub-
stantive constitutional limitations, review of procedural due process
at the administrative level, and finally review of administrative ap-
plication of statutes to individual cases. Clearly there is no occasion
for direct substantive review here. And judicial review of adminis-
trative procedure has been denied by the Knauff case, supra, large-
ly as a result of the Court's expanding concept of substantive due
process. However, if these two types of judicial re-examination are
not permissible, is respondent also to be denied the protection
which he might derive from the operation of the courts as a third
and co-equal branch of government? The Court predicates its af-
firmative answer on the assumption that any judicial review in
this case would involve an evaluation of the constitutionality of
administrative action. In reality, the Court need only invoke its
power of interpretation and application of legislation td a specific
situation. Its failure to do so reveals a dangerous judicial tendency
to allow a fluid concept of due process to dilute the equally im-
portant safeguard of separation of powers and hence to shield a
large area of administrative action from the eyes of the Court.
Mildred M. Mangum
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - SEPARATON OF POWERS -
LEGISLATIE INFRMGEUMT OF TE JuDiciAL FUNCTION,
The Indiana Department of Revenue, Inheritance Tax Division,
filed a petition for reappraisement and redetermination of inherit-
ance and transfer taxes, pursuant to IND. ANN. STAT. § 62412
(Burns 1933). This statute provided for mandatory setting aside
of the judgment of the probate court upon petition by the Inherit-
ance Tax Division. Held, unconstitutional on the ground that the
legislature, in thus requiring the setting aside of a judgment of the
probate court, infringed upon the judicial department of govern-
ment and consequently violated the separation of powers provisions
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of the state constitution. Indiana Department of Revenue v. Calla-
way, -Ind. -, 110 N.E. 2d 903 (1953).
The Supreme Court of the United States has assumed without
deciding that nothing in the Constitution of the United States pro-
hibits a state from uniting the legislative and judicial functions in a
single body. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210 (1908).
But, the exercise of the judicial function by a state legislature is
prohibited, either expressly or by implication, by all the state consti-
tutions now in force, except as directed or permitted therein. Omo
CONST. Art. II, § 1; IDAHO CONST. Art. V, § 13; MASS. CONST. Part
I, Art. XXX, § 31.
The legislature may constitutionally place reasonable restric-
tions upon the functions of the judiciary, providing these restric-
tions do not defeat or materially impair the exercise of those func-
tions. Thus the legislature may, within proper bounds, prescribe
rules of practice and procedure for the exercise of judicial juris-
diction. Thompson v. Redington, 92 Ohio St. 101, 110 N.E. 652
(1915), Aucutt v. Aucutt, 22 Tex. 518, 62 S.W. 2d 77, 89 A.L.R.
1198 (1933). It has also been held that a statute forbidding the
courts to grant injunctions against peaceful picketing in connection
with labor disputes was constitutional in that it did not deprive
the courts of original jurisdiction. Fenske Bros. v. Upholsterers'
International Union, 358 IlM. 239, 193 N.E. 112 (1934).
Yet, acts which operate to set aside judgments, Cominetti v.
Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. of California, 22 Cal. 2d 340, 139
P. 2d. 908 (1943); or require action by a court within a specified
time, Kostas v. Johnson, 224 Ind. 540, 69 N.E. 2d 592, 168 A-L.R.
1118 (1946); Salemento v. State 188 Ind. 170, 122 N.E. 578 (1919);
or prohibit directed verdicts, Thoe v. Chicago N. & St. P. Ry. 181
Wis. 456, 195 N.W. 407, 29 A.L.R. 1080 (1923), have been declared
unconstitutional because of encroachment upon the judicial func-
tion. Those acts which attempt to direct statutory interpretation,
State v. Schlenker, 112 Iowa 642, 84 N.W. 698 (1900); and those
attempting to prevent courts from issuing writs of mandamus, State
ex rel Buckwater v. Lakeland, 112 Fla. 200, 150 So. 508, 90 A.L.R.
1280 (1933), have also been invalidated.
The line of demarcation between validity and invalidity is
illustrated by two cases involving statutes regulating admission to
the State Bars of California and Oklahoma, respectively. The Cali-
fornia law, which established a board to determine the qualifica-
tions for admission to the bar, was upheld because the board could
only make recommendations, thus leaving the final control in the
judiciary. Brydonjack v. State Bar, 208 Cal. 439, 281 Pac. 1018
(1929). The other statute, which attempted to qualify persons for
admission to the bar, was declared unconstitutional because it took
[Vol. 15
RECENT DECISIONS
the finality of decision from the judiciary. In Re Bledsoe, 186 Okla.
264, 97 P. 2d 556 (1939). The reasoning underlying the other de-
cisions seems to follow the state bar cases. Directing the interpre-
tation of statutes would deprive the judiciary of ultimate control
of the adjudicative process. So also would laws prohibiting directed
verdicts, requiring action in a specified time, or setting aside judg-
ments. These acts are mandatory, leaving no discretion to the
courts. On the other hand statutes directory in character or pro-
viding for advisory action, or those prescribing rules of procedure,
leave to the judiciary the final decision over judicial matters. They
thus do not defeat or greatly impair the judicial function.
Kenneth Callahan
DAMAGES -ARGUMENT TO JURY -
IxcoME TAX LiABIInT in FnG THE AWAR
The plaintiff brought an action under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 51-60, for personal injuries sustained
while performing his duties as a brakeman for defendant railroad.
The jury returned a verdict of $50,000 in favor of plaintiff but there-
after the court granted plaintiff's motion for a new trial. It appears
the court had ruled in chambers that the damages should be based
on plaintiff's gross earnings prior to the accident; and in view of
that ruling, the court thought that counsel for the defendant had
exceeded the bounds of propriety in reminding the jury, during
argument, that the final award would not be subject to income tax.
On appeal, held, it was proper for defendant's counsel to remind
the jury, during argument, that awards received by way of verdicts
in personal injury cases are exempt from federal income tax. Order
reversed and cause remanded with directions. Hall v. Chicago &
N.W. R.R., 349 Ill. App. 175, 110 N.E. 2d 654 (1953).
In personal injury litigation, the problem of income tax arises
in at least two distinct ways. The first problem is whether plaintiff's
gross earnings (i.e., before taxes) or net earnings (i.e., after taxes)
prior to the injury should be the basis for determining probable
future income in computing the amount of damages. The second
problem is whether the jury may properly be reminded in argu-
ment, or instructed by the court, that the final award is not subject
to income tax as provided by 26 U.S.C.A. 22 (b): "The following
items shall not be included in gross income and shall be exempt
from taxation under this chapter: (5) Compensation for injuries
or sickness ... amounts received through accident or health insur-
ance or under workmen's compensation acts, as compensation for
personal injuries or sickness, plus the amount of any damages re-
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ceived whether by suit or agreement on account of such injuries
or sickness...."
In dealing with the first problem, the federal courts seem to
have reached conflicting results in deciding whether to use gross
or net earnings. Two courts of appeals have held that the award
should be based on gross earnings since future income taxes are
too conjectural to permit reliance on past net earnings. Stokes v.
United States, 144 F. 2d 82 (2nd Cir. 1944); Chicago & N.W. R.R. v.
Curl, 178 F. 2d 497 (8th Cir. 1949). More recently, the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in another personal injury case, in-
dicated that net earnings should be used. Southern Pacific Co. v.
Guthrie, 180 F. 2d 195 (9th Cir. 1949). The court reasoned that
taxes would be as certain as the prospects of continued earnings,
so taxes were to be deducted in computing the actual loss. This
general principle of basing the award on net earnings was ap-
parently affirmed on rehearing, although it was not applied because
of the particular fact situation. Southern Pacific Co. v. Guthrie,
186 F. 2d 926 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 904 (1951).
An Ohio case, Smith v. Pennsylvania R.R., 59 Ohio L. Abs. 282,
99 N.E. 2d 501 (1950), said such taxes were too speculative and
held that gross earnings was the proper measure.
The trial court in the principal case ruled that gross earnings
should be considered but then went a step further and held that
it was improper for the defendant's counsel to remind the jury
during argument that the final award was not subject to income
tax. In so ruling, the trial court failed to distinguish between the
two problems, mentioned above. The trial court apparently took
the position that if gross income had been used in determining
damages (problem one) then it could not properly allow arguments
to the jury about deduction of income tax from the final award
(problem two).
The appellate court in the principal case corrected this failure
to distinguish problem two from problem one in holding that it was
permissible for counsel to remind the jury during argument that
the award would not be taxable even though gross earnings had
been the basis for figuring the amount of the award. The principal
case followed a Mlissouri decision, Dempsey v. Thompson, 251 S.W.
2d 42 (1952), which had held that it was proper and desirable to
instruct the jury that the final award was not subject to income
tax. The reasoning of the principal case was that, if it was proper
for the court to so instruct the jury, then it follows that it is also
proper for counsel to remind the jury of the law whether or not
an instruction to that effect is given by the court. Contrary to this
reasoning is a recent Ohio court of appeals case, Pfister v. City of
Cleveland, - Ohio App. -, 113 N.E. 2d 366 (1953); appeal dis-
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missed, 159 Ohio St. 580, 142 N.E. 2d 657 (1953). The court stated
that since the trial court had not mentioned the tax problem, refer-
ence by defendant's attorney to the fact of the non-taxability of the
verdict in final argument to the jury was highly improper. But the
court of appeals held that since the plaintiff had failed to object,
the question was not available to him on appeal.
In personal injury litigation in Ohio, if the defendant wishes
to refer to the non-taxability of the verdict in final argument, it
might be advisable for defendant's counsel, under the provisions of
Omo REV. CODE § 2315.01 (11420-1) to make a request for special
instructions to be given in writing to the jury on this point of law
before argument. Bartson v. Craig, 121 Ohio St. 371, 169- N.E. 291
(1929); Behan v. The Cincinnati Street Ry., 78 Ohio App. 129
69 N.E. 2d 160 (1946). Then, after the special instruction has been
given, counsel in final argument presumably could remind the jury
that they have been so instructed on this point of law. However,
no Ohio case has been found in which such a special instruction
was requested.
Carl V. Bruggeman
DoMsTIc R riONS - ALImoNY -
INSURAN E Pox.icy NOT PROPERTY
In an action for divorce in which defendant husband, served
by publication only, made no appearance, the plaintiff sought all
right and title to two contracts of insurance belonging to defendant.
Defendant insurance company, personally served as a party defend-
ant, admitted issuing the policies and denied all other allegations
of plaintiff's petition. The policies, with the plaintiff as beneficiary,
reserved to the insured the option of changing the beneficiary with-
out her consent. Plaintiff had physical possession of the policies and
had been paying the premiums. The trial court granted the divorce
and awarded plaintiff all right and title to the policies. On appeal
to the court of appeals, held, that part of the decree awarding
plaintiff all defendant husband's right and title in the policies was
erroneous. Whitelaw v. Whitelaw, 65 Ohio L. Abs. 11, 113 N.E. 2d
105 (1952).
An action for alimony may be had against a defendant sum-
moned only by constructive service if said defendant has property
within the court's jurisdiction and the property is brought under
the court's control at the beginning of the action. Benner v. Benner,
63 Ohio St. 220, 58 N.E. 569 (1900); The Cleveland and Buffalo
Transit Co. v. Beeman, 12 Ohio Cir. Ct. (N.S.) 460, 16 Ohio Cir.
Ct. (N.S.) 112 (1909), affirmed without opinion 81 Ohio St. 509,
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91 N.E. 1126 (1909); Pennington v. Fourth National Bank of Cin-
cinnati, Ohio, 243 U.S. 269 (1917); Reed v. Reed, 121 Ohio St. 188,
167 N.E. 684, 64 A.L.R. 1384 (1929). For the situation in other
states see: FREEMAN ON JUDGMENTS (5th ed., 1925), Vol. I, p.
2977; 17 Am. Jur., Divorce and Separation § 521, n. 7 (1938);
29 A.L.R. 1381 (1924); 64 A.L.R. 1392 (1929); 108 A.L.R. 1302
(1937). The courts hold that a suit for alimony under these cir-
cumstances is an action in rem and that constructive service may
be had under Oio REV. CODE § 2703.14 (G) (11292-7). Benner v.
Benner, supra; Reed v. Reed, supra; Francis v. Allen, 37 Ohio
Op. 362, 79 N.E. 2d 803 (1947). This action does not deny the de-
fendant his property without due process of law if the court gets
control of the property at the beginning of the action; the state
has jurisdiction over property within its boundaries. Pennington v.
Fourth National Bank, supra; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
A description of the property in the petition and a temporary in-
junction restraining transfer, or an adequate description of the
property in both the petition and the publication, will give the
court control over the property for purposes of this action. Benner
v. Benner, supra; Reed v. Reed, supra. One case, although holding
it not sufficient, suggested a judgment might be given even though
the property was not described in the petition or seized in any way.
Parker v. Parker, 28 Ohio L. Abs. 49, 56 N.E. 2d 527 (1938). Both
real and personal property, tangible and intangible, are included.
(Real property) Benner v. Benner, supra; (Personal property,
tangible) Reed v. Reed, supra; (Bank account) Pennington v.
Fourth National Bank, supra; (Stock) The Cleveland and Buffalo
Transit Co. v. Beeman, supra; (Life insurance policy) Hoffman v.
Hoffman, 28 Ohio L. Abs. 370, 13 Ohio Op. 504 (1938); contra,
Greenlee v. New York Life Insurance Co., 9 Ohio L. Abs. 331
(1930), dismissed on other grounds, 123 Ohio St. 599, 176 N.E. 456
(1931). The rule on constructive service in alimony cases also ap-
plies to alimony pendente lite. Wilson v. Wilson, 40 Ohio L. Abs.
281, 28 Ohio Op. 363 (1944).
Insurance has been defined not only as a personal contract
but also as intangible personal property. Burnett v. Wells, 289 U.S.
670 (1933) ; see 29 Am. Jur., Insurance § 126 (1940). If the insured
has the option of changing the beneficiary, there is no vested right
in the beneficiary until the insured's death even though the bene-
ficiary has paid the premiums. Minning v. Prudential Insurance
Company of America, 88 Ohio App. 339, 95 N.E. 2d 269 (1950);
Stone v. Stephens et al., 155 Ohio St. 595, 99 N.E. 2d 266 (1951).
But a tendency to allow recovery is indicated by some community
property cases where the courts have decided that the insured
may not change the beneficiary without his consent. Occidental Life
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Insurance Company v. Powers, 192 Wash, 475, 74 P. 2d 27 (1937);
See Note 168 A.L.R. 347 (1947); 29 Am. Jur., Insurance § 1314
(1940). It has also been held that if a wife had paid the premiums,
the statute abrogating a wife's insurable right in her husband on
divorce would not apply. Ficke v. Prudential Insurance Company
of America, 305 Ky. 171, 202 S.W. 2d 429, 175 A.L.R. 1215 (1947).
The prevailing rule, in the absence of statute, is that a divorced
wife who is beneficiary on a policy taken out during the marriage
may collect the proceeds at the insured's death. Hergenrather v.
State Mutual Life Assur. Co. of Worcester et al., 79 Ohio App. 116,
68 N.E. 2d 269 (1946); Overhiser, Adm'x. v. Overhiser et al., 63
Ohio St. 77, 57 N.E. 965, 50 L.R.A. 552 (1900); Stone v. Stephens,
92 Ohio App. 53, 110 N.E. 2d 18 (1950), affirmed, 155 Ohio St. 595,
99 N.E. 2d 766 (1951). VANCE ON INsURANcE (3rd ed., 1951), p. 714.
From this it follows that plaintiff, if given the decree, could keep
the policy. Most courts will allow a decree of alimony or a property
settlement to include an insurance policy where there is personal
service on the defendant. Foulks v. Foulks, 49 Ohio App. 291, 197
N.E. 201 (1934); Pearson v. Pearson, 35 Ohio L. Abs. 488, 41 N.E.
2d 725 (1941); see Note, 145 A.L.R. 522.
Is a life insurance policy "property" in an in rem action for
alimony? Two Ohio courts have discussed this specific question
before and have arrived at different results. In Greenlee v. New
York Life Ins. Co., supra, the court refused to grant the wife all
right and title of the nonresident defendant in the policies, but the
court did make the alimony judgment a lien on the insurance
policies. In Hoffman v. Hoffman, supra, the common pleas court,
in a case closely resembling the principal case, allowed the wife
all her husband's right and title to the policies. The judge in dis-
cussing the Greenlee case, supra, felt if the court had jurisdiction
to impose a lien, it also should have jurisdiction to grant a decree
changing title. According to the Hoffman case, supra, the word
"property" under the applicable statutes, OHio REV. CODE §§ 2703.14
(G) and (I) (11292), 3105.06 (8003-7), 3105.18 (8003-17, 8003-19),
3105.19 (8003-20), is a very broad term. The case declares an in-
surance policy to be an obligation to pay someone in the future,
making it comparable to a promissory note due at some future time.
If this analysis is correct, then the Pennington case, supra, would
apply.
The reasoning of the principal case probably represents the
majority view on insurance. However, there are good reasons for
granting plaintiff the relief prayed for. She has paid the premiums
on the policies. Personal service was had on the insurance company
which would give the court adequate control over defendant hus-
band's property in its hands. Oro REv. CODE § 3105.19; The Cleve-
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land and Buffalo Transit Co. v. Beeman, supra. Giving security
to a deserted wife and children is of the utmost importance; there-
fore the term "property" as it applies to in rem alimony actions
should be a very broad term, perhaps including insurance in its
scope.
David W. Carroll
INComE TAXATION-PREFERRED STOCK "BAmoUT"
The taxpayers were stockholders in a closely held corporation
which had a surplus of over $1,000,000.00 Chamberlin, who owned
82% of the outstanding common stock, was afraid of a possible Sec.
102 tax liability if the money was left in the corporation, but hesi-
tated to declare a dividend because of high ordinary income tax
rates. 8,020 shares of 4/2% cumulative $100 par preferred non-
voting stock were authorized and issued pro rata to the stock-
holders. Two days later, as a result of a prearranged plan, the
stockholders sold the preferred stock to insurance companies for
$800,000.00. Each stockholder reported his proportion of the pro-
ceeds as a long term capital gain after allocating the basis of the
old stock between that stock and the preferred. The Commissioner
determined that the transaction was equivalent to a dividend tax-
able as ordinary income. The tax court agreed with the Com-
missioner since all the circumstances, including absence of cor-
porate business purpose, made it in substance a cash dividend. 18
T.C. 164 (1952). Held, reversed. A stock dividend of preferred on
common, when only common is outstanding, does not change the
proportional interests of the stockholders and is not taxable income
even though a sale by the stockholders to an outsider was pre-
arranged and there was no corporate business purpose. C. P. Cham-
berlin v. Commissioner, 207 F. 2d 462 (6th Cir. 1953).
The Internal Revenue Code provides that a stock dividend shall
not be treated as a dividend to the extent that it does not consti-
tute income to the stockholder within the meaning of the Sixteenth
Amendment. IwT. REV. CODE § 115 (f) (1). The test applied by the
courts in determining the taxability of stock dividends is the pro-
portional interest test, i.e. the stockholder's proportional interest in
the corporation must be essentially different after the stock divi-
dend than it was before for the dividend to be taxed. Towne v.
Eisner, 245 U. S. 418 (1918); Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189
(1920).
Under the "proportional interest" test, the nature of the divi-
dend determines its tax status. Common on common is not taxable.
Eisner v. Macomber, supra; Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U. S. 371
(1943). Common on preferred is taxable. Koshland v. Helvering,
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298 U. S. 441 (1936). Preferred on common with other preferred
previously outstanding is taxable. Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U. S.
238 (1937). Non-voting on voting common is not taxable. Helvering
v. Sprouse, 318 U. S. 604 (1943). Preferred on common when no
preferred is previously outstanding, as in the principal case, was
held not taxable in Strassburger v. Commissioner, 318 U. S. 604
(1943). The Court in the principal case bases its decision on this
case. The Court looks to the redemption feature in determining
whether there was a stock dividend in substance as well as in
form. The stock was issued in 1946 and was subject to redemption
at quarterly dividend dates and to periodic mandatory redemption
after 1948 until retired in 1954. The Court found that these re-
demption provisions were the type required by conservative in-
vestors and were not so liberal that the transaction could be con-
sidered a cash dividend.
In the instant case, the tax court considered the stock divi-
dend, the immediate sale and the subsequent redemption as one
transaction. The court of appeals refused to apply this step trans-
action approach. Judge Miller pointed out that, "the legal effect of
the dividend is determined at the time of its distribution, not by
what the stockholders do with it after its receipt."
The recapitalization area is closely related. In Bazley v. Com-
missioner, 331 U. S. 737 (1946), the stockholders turned in shares
for debentures in a recapitalization relying on INr. REv. CODE 112
(b) (3), but the Court held this was not a tax-free reorganization
since all the circumstances made it equivalent to a cash dividend.
In view of this recent expression of hostility to one form of "bail-
out," it appears likely that, if certiorari is granted by the Supreme
Court, the Chamberlin situation will be treated by that Court in
the same manner as the Bazley situation.
On January 28, 1954, the House Ways and Means Committee
reached a tentative agreement on a proposal for change in the
Internal Revenue Code designed to prevent tax avoidance which
may result from the principal case. The proposed legislation
would "impose an 85% transfer tax on a corporation which has
distributed otherwise non-taxable preferred stock at the time it
redeems such stock if redemption occurs within ten years of the
time the stock was issued." The tax, however, would not apply
in the following five situations: when the redemption was made
in liquidation, when there was also a proportional redemption of
the stock on which the preferred stock was issued, when the re-
demption was of preferred stock issued for contribution of prop-
erty, when the redemption is treated as a dividend, and when the
redemption was made to pay death taxes. 5 CCH 1954 FED. TAx
REP. p. 41,007-8; U. S. L. WEEK 2353 (Feb. 2, 1954).
John Marshall Adams
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PLEADnqG - Jonx'DER OF WRONGFUL DEATH AND SuRVivAL AcTioNs
An administrator of the estate of a fifteen year old boy, elec-
trocuted when he came in contact with the defendant's high voltage
were, joined a cause of action for the wrongful death with a cause
of action for conscious pain and suffering. The defendant demur-
red for a misjoinder of causes of action. The trial court overruled
the demurrer and the plaintiff received a verdict and a judgment
on both of the causes. The court of appeals held that there was no
error in overruling the demurrer, but reversed that part of the
judgment as to the survival action, saying there was no evidence
of any conscious pain and suffering. In a divided opinion, the
majority of the supreme court held that such causes of action
could not be joined without an enabling statute. Fielder v. Ohio
Edison Co. 158 Ohio St. 375, 190 N.E. 2d 855 (1953).
Ohio's wrongful death statute, modeled upon Lord Campbell's
Act, creates a new cause of action in favor of the decedent's per-
sonal representative, as trustee, for the benefit of certain designated
next of kin for the damage resulting from death. Gibson v. Solomon,
136 Ohio St. 101, 23 N.E. 2d 996 (1939); Omo Rav. CODE: §§
2125.01 (10509-166) et seq. Since the statute creates the liability, the
suit is different from an ordinary action of tort. Minglewood Coal
Co. v. Carson, 31 Ohio App. 237, 166 N.E. 237 (1928). A judgment
for the defendant in a survival action is not res judicata as to a
wrongful death action, The May Coal Co. v. Robinette, 120 Ohio
St. 110, 165 N.E. 576 (1929) since the issues as to all the real parties
in interest were not decided in the first survival action. The de-
fendant in an action for wrongful death cannot set up a counter-
claim for damages against the estate. Epinger v. Wade, 142 Ohio St.
460, 52 N.E. 2d 852 (1944).
The Ohio survival statute, on the other hand, provides for the
survival to the estate of a deceased person of any cause of action
arising out of injury to his person or property which he could have
himself maintained. Onio REV. CODE § 2305.21 (11235). Some juris-
dictions have but a single cause of action which proceeds upon the
theory of preserving the cause of action vested in the decedent at
the moment of death and gives as an incident to this action com-
pensatory damages to the next of kin. ILL. STAT., c. 70 (Cahill's
1936). In other states, the statutes expressly provide that the per-
sonal representative may join the cause of action for the wrongful
death with the survived cause of action when both causes of action
arise out of the same wrongful act. MAss. ANN. LAws, c. 229,
§ 6 (1933). See Note, 124 A.L.R. 611 (1940).
The Ohio statute relating to joinder of causes of action, Orno
Rav. CODE § 2309.05 (11306), permits the uniting of several causes
of action arising out of the same transaction or transactions connect-
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ed with the same subject of action. This statute is to be liberally
construed, Railroad Co. v. Cook, 37 Ohio St. 265 (1881); however,
this section is limited by OHno REV. CODE § 2309.06 (11307) in that
all of the causes of action so united must affect all the parties in
the action.
The lower courts of Ohio had given this latter provision a
rather broad construction, as evidenced by the trial court and court
of appeals decisions in the principal case. In several past instances
a joinder of causes of action not clearly affecting all of the parties
has been permitted. Buckeye Stages v. Townsend, 28 Ohio N.P.
(N.S.) 222 (1930), allowed a joinder of a wrongful death and sur-
vival action. Contra: Betz v. Hortz, 4 Ohio Op. 174, 2 Ohio L. Abs.
479 (1935). Meyers v. Miller, 2 Ohio Dec. Rep. 319 (1857), allowed
a joinder of an assignor and the maker of a note. Sicbern v. Meyer,
11 Ohio Dec. Rep. 344 (1891), permitted a joinder of sureties on
the original bond with those on his additional bond. Gravell v.
Speakman, 8 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 246 (1909), and Warren v. Howard,
24 Ohio Dec. (N.P.) 32 (1913), allowed a joinder of a police of-
ficer and his surety on his official bond. Although it may be diffi-
cult to reconcile these holdings with the literal wording of the
statute, they, nevertheless, are important as indications of the at-
titude of the Ohio courts toward joining causes of action - in
general, that considerable latitude could be given to considerations
of convenience and efficiency when they become factors in the
joinder problem.
In the principal case the majority ruling is based on the idea
that, with respect to the two causes of action, the administrator
acts in different capacities for the benefit of different persons. This
interpretation has extended OHto REV. CODE § 2309.06 (11307) so
that not only must the causes of action affect all the parties, but
they must affect those parties in precisely the same capacity. The
minority would have allowed a joinder since both of the actions are
maintainable in the name of the personal representative against
the same defendant or defendants.
The supreme court has attached a peculiar legal definition to
the phrase "must affect all the parties to the action," which, it is
submitted, extends the concept of "same right or capacity" too far.
Consequently, according to the principal case, to join two causes
of action, the claims must be literally prosecuted in the same
identical right as well as in the same capacity. This interpretation
encourages a multiplicity of suits. The two causes do have a close
kinship in that the same questions of law and fact arise and the
proof of liability is substantially the same. The jury could be in-
structed that evidence of pain and suffering should be considered
19541
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
only in determining the amount of damages as to the survival
cause of action.
Legislation should be enacted in order that Ohio may place
itself in accord with the modern liberal trend as exemplified by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Such legislation might take
the form of the addition of the following provision to Onto REv.
CODE § 2309.06 (11307): "provided, this section shall not prevent
a joinder of a cause of action for wrongful death brought under
sections 2125.01 to 2125.04, inclusive, of the Revised Code, with
a surviving action for injuries to the person or property brought
under section 2305.21 of the Revised Code."
William Newman
PROPERTY - CHATTEL MORTGAGE -
AsSIGN ENT OF CLAIM FOR CoNVESsIO
The chattel mortgagor assigned to the United States, as mort-
gagee,- all the right, title, and interest and any claim which the
mortgagor might have for the alleged conversion of the wheat by
the defendant. The United States Court of Appeals, held, in re-
versing the trial court that the mortgagee could properly bring an
action for the conversion of the mortgaged property. United States
v. Butt, 203 F. 2d 643 (10th Cir. 1953).
At early common law it was an established principle that no
chose in action, whether ex contractu or ex delicto, could be as-
signed. United States v. Gills, 95 U. S. 407, (1877);
Strong v. Clem, 12 Ind. 37, 74 Am. Dec. 148 (1859). This rule was
based upon a principle of public policy, which forbade the use of
the machinery of the courts for any action which savored of chain-
perty and maintenance. Sullivan v. Curling, 149 Ga. 96, 99 S.E. 533
(1919). The legal theory, denying the assignment of rights of ac-
tion was based on the ground that one who claims as the mere
assignee must fail in the attempt to enforce the right as he is not
in privity with the person against whom the obligation exists. A
later development in the law recognized the assignability of choses
arising ex contractu. Sullivan v. Curling, supra.
An exception was engrafted upon this common law rule by the
Statute of 4 Edw. I, Chap. 7, which gave a remedy to executors
for a trespass to the personal estate of their testators, this remedy
later being extended to administrators by equitable construction.
Ultimately the principle arose permitting the survivorship of ac-
tions arising from injuries to personal property during the lifetime
of the deceased. Bethlehem Fabricators v. H. D. Watts Co., 287
Mass. 28, 190 N.E. 828 (1934). A distinction is to be observed be-
tween those causes of action for wrongs affecting the person strictly
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and all other actions. Accordingly, the general rule today is that
a right of action in tort which does not apply to the person strictly,
but involves directly or indirectly an injury to a right of property,
will survive. Grand Trunk Western R. Co. v. H. W. Nelson Co.,
116 F. 2d 823, rehearsing denied, 118 F. 2d 252 (1941); Wikstrom v.
Yolo Fliers Club, 206 Cal. 461, 274 Pac. 959 (1929). The test now ap-
plied to determine whether a cause of action arising ex delicto is
assignable is whether the cause of action is one which will survive.
Purely personal rights which die with the person cannot be as-
signed. North Chicago Street R. Co. v. Ackley, 171 Ill. 100, 49 N.E.
222 (1897). But actions in conversion which survive as assets of the
estate are capable of assignment. Cook v. Ball, 144 F. 2d 423, cert.
den., 323 U. S. 761 (1944); Staley v. McClurken, 35 Cal. App. 2d
622, 96 P. 2d 805 (1939). In the instant case, the court followed
this principle. This is the first of two reasons the court sets forth
when it said that, "a claim for the conversion of personal property
ordinarily survives the death of the owner, is assignable, and the
assignee may maintain an action upon the assignment."
These rules as to the survivorship and assignability of actions
ex delicto have been codified in many states. IowA CODE § 3443
(1946); Dunshee v. Standard Oil Co., 165 Iowa 625, 146 N.W. 830
(1914); Babcock v. Canadian Northern R. Co., 117 Minn. 434, 136
N.W. 275 (1912). It should be noted, however, that a code pro-
vision that every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real
party in interest makes no change in the assignability of choses in
action, but merely allows bringing the action in the name of the as-
signee in the case of a chose in action properly assignable. Hodg-
man v. Western R. Corp., 7 How. Pr. (N.Y.) 492 (1852).
As a second reason for allowing the plaintiff to recover, the
court in the instant case stated that a mortgagee may maintain
an action against a person converting the property included in the
mortgage. This follows the general rule that a mortgagee has a right
of action against anyone who interferes with his rights under the
mortgage or impairs his security. Norton v. Shields, 174 App. Div.
804, 161 N.Y.S. 880 (1916); Harris v. Seaboard Airline R. Co., 190
N.C. 480, 130 S.E. 319 (1925).
In Ohio, the rule also is that choses ex delicto which will sur-
vive death, such as an injury to property, are assignable. Cincin-
nati v. Hafer, 49 Ohio St. 60, 30 N.E. 197 (1892); Grant v. Ludlow,
8 Ohio St. 1 (1857). A statute in Ohio states that all causes shall
survive which are based on injuries to property or which survived
at common law. Omo REV. CODE § 2305.21 (11235). Ohio also has
a code provision stating that an action must be brought in the name
of the real party in interest. OHio REv. CODE § 2307.05 (11241).
Therefore, an assignor is not a necessary party to an action brought
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by an assignee in his own name to recover on the assignment.
Allen v. Miller, 11 Ohio St. 374 (1860).
As to the second reason stated by the court in the instant
case, Ohio has held that a mortgagee of chattels may sue for the
conversion of the mortgaged property. City Loan & Say. Co. v.
Dickison, 19 O.N.P. (N.S.) 215, 26 O.D.N.P. 593 (1916).
Thus it is true in Ohio and generally throughout the country
that all rights growing out of and adhering to property, both ex
contractu and ex delicto, may pass by assignment. Shively v. Shive-
ly, 88 Ohio App. 7, 95 N.E. 2d 276 (1950); Fosdick v. Barr, 3 Ohio
St. 471 (1854). The result in the principal case seems to be a rea-
sonable one, as the person who has been assigned an interest in
property logically ought to be permitted to prosecute his claim
against the wrongdoer who has converted the property.
Carl E. Juergens
STATE TAXATION - FRANcmsE TAX - INVENTORY VALUATION
The taxpayer's inventory was valued by the last in-first out
method. The tax Commissioner ruled that LIFO did not properly
state the value of the corporation's inventory and therefore cor-
rected the corporation's tax report by using another method to
value its inventories. This increased the value of the inventory
thus producing a higher franchise tax base; consequently an
arrearage assessment was made. On appeal to the Board of Tax Ap-
peals, the commissioner was reversed whereupon he appealed to
the supreme court. Held, affirmed, (1) for purposes of the Ohio
franchise tax the Tax Commissioner must accept book value and is
without authority to raise inventory values even though fair value
exceeds book value. No provision of Orno REV. CODE § 5733.05
(5498) gives the commissioner authority to increase the amount
of any balance sheet asset when books have been kept in compli-
ance with Onto REv. CODE § 5733.02 (5495-2) (5496) and § 5733.03
(5497). To imply such a power would be to construe a taxing
statute against a taxpayer. Section 5733.05 gives the commissioner
(provided a fair value claim is filed) express authority to decrease
book value where book value exceeds fair value; the rule expressio
unius est exclusio alterius requires a conclusion against implication
of power to increase book value. (2) Where the legislature meant
for the commissioner to have authority to increase as well as de-
crease book value such authority is expressly given as evidenced
by OHIo REV. CODE § 5711.18 (5389) where with regard to personal
property taxation commissioner may increase as well as decrease
book value. (3) Book value for franchise tax purposes is de-
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termined from books regarded as the accounting records of the
taxpayer which are kept in the ordinary cause of business and in
accordance with a proper accounting system. National Tube Com-
pany v. Peck, 159 Ohio St. 98, 111 N.E. 2d 11 (1949).
LIFO has been accepted by accountants as a proper method
of determining cost for inventory purposes where it most clearly
reflects periodic income. Accounting Research Bulletin #29: Inven-
tory Pricing by 1946-1947 Committee in Accounting Procedure,
American Institute of Accountants. The Revenue Act of 1939 which
added Section 22 (d) to the Internal Revenue Code made the adop-
tion of the LIFO method of inventory valuation optional but pro-
vided that the method must be used consistently. A subsequent In-
ternal Revenue regulation (U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.22 (d) -1
et seq.) provided that the taxpayer must file a written election to
adopt LIFO and could not thereafter discontinue without good
cause and consent of the commissioner. At first, due to strict pro-
visions of the 1939 law only taxpayers using a uniform raw ma-
terial which represented a large part of the value of the finished
product and which had a long finishing process adopted LIFO.
Subsequently the earlier requirements were liberalized and LIFO
was more widely used; due to the excess profits tax and inflationary
pressures in 1950 more organizations became interested in LIFO.
Welsch, LIFO Method of Inventory Valuation, 30 TAxEs 343 (1952).
Thus for federal tax purposes LIFO may be used. Budik, Technical
Tax Aspects of LIFO, 21 N.Y. CERT. PuB. AccT. 749, 782 (1951).
Ohio has no statute or rule of the Tax Commissioner respecting
LIFO method of inventory valuation but has permitted it in proper
cases. See The Standard Oil Company v. Glander, Ohio B.T.A., No.
13145 (1949).
In the Standard Oil case, supra, the taxpayer in 1941 changed
from FIFO to LIFO. In effecting this change taxpayer set up a
ledger account reflecting difference between valuation of its in-
ventory on both a FIFO and LIFO basis; this account was a surplus
reserve called "reserve for adjustment of inventory to FIFO" and
was carried from 1942 to 1945 but the taxpayer says only for his
own personal satisfaction and that information was never carried
into a franchise tax report or any other report on inventory value.
An examiner discovered the account and considering it to be a
reserve account added it to taxpayer's annual inventory. Under
Omo REV. CODE § 5733.05 (5498) reserves other than reserves for
depreciation and depletion and taxes due and payable for year in
which report is to be filed are includable in the tax base. Tax
Commission of Ohio v. The National Malleable Casting Co., 111
Ohio St. 117, 144 N.E. 604 (1924). The Board of Tax Appeals in
affirming the Commissioner's disallowance of these reserves which
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in effect put taxpayer back on FIFO states that the Commissioner
does not have to accept valuation which taxpayer presents in his
franchise tax report, that such valuation may be rejected, that when
report appears incorrect due to wide spread between LIFO and
FIFO he can correct the report by adopting FIFO inventory found
within the files of the tax-payer which in effect amounts to a dis-
allowance of the reserve. In final paragraph the Board quotes
from Commissioner's brief to effect that reserve was used to re-
duce inventory value without a fair value claim being made. But
the Board says further that the Commissioner does not have to ac-
cept any figure at which a corporation may value tangible personal
property but in determination of fair value may use all information
available.
Thus it is arguable that the Board of Tax Appeals based their
decision on factors other than right to include reserves in the tax
base. The Commissioner's objection to inventory valuation in prin-
cipal case supports this view for in that case there was no reserve
account. Apparently the Commissioner felt he could reject valua-
tion as stated by corporation in their report and attempt to de-
termine fair value from any information available to him. Before
the Board in the National Tube case the Commissioner said he did
not have to accept general ledger account figures of inventory if
they did not represent fair value and that the test of value in OHo
REV. CODE § 5733.05 (5498) is fair value; that the legislature did
not mean to provide a one way street whereby the tax-payer could
get a reduction when book value exceeded fair value but Commis-
sioner was prohibited from raising when fair value exceeded book
value. National Tube Co. v. Peck, Ohio B.T.A., No. 20579 (1952).
However, the Board of Tax Appeals in the National Tube case re-
versed the Commissioner thus impliedly overruling much of their
reasoning in the Standard Oil case.
The Supreme Court in affirming the Board in the principal
case holds test of value in Omo REv. CODE § 5733.05 (5498) is book
value and when books are kept in compliance with OHIo REV. CODE
§ 5733.02 (5495-2, 5496) and § 5733.03 (5497) the Commissioner
must find the report to be correct; that § 5733.05 gives Commis-
sioner no power to increase valuation when book value is below
actual value. Before the Board of Tax Appeals both the Commis-
sioner and the National Tube Company cited the first syllabus of
Jacob B. Perkins Co. v. Glander, 153 Ohio St. 501, 92 N.E. 2d 690
(1950), for proposition that the Commissioner must accept book
value as shown by company records. The Commissioner contends
that company records kept pursuant to Omo REV. CODE § 5711.22
(5388) which requires personal property to be valued at actual
value for purposes of personal property tax are books of the com-
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pany and may be used in determining book value. The court re-
jects this contention citing Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Evatt, 143 Ohio
St. 71, 54 N.E. 2d 132 (1944), which held that records of appraisal
of personal property which were not entered in books did not re-
flect book value of personal property but that book value was ob-
tained from a capital account on taxpayer's books which are used
in ordinary course of his business. Furthermore Omo REV. CODE
§ 5711.18 expressly gives assessor authority to increase as well as
decrease book value of personal property. Thus valuation methods
and records required for personal property tax are to be distin-
guished from those permissible for the franchise tax.
The decision in the principal case overrules all of the reasons
advanced by the Board in the Standard Oil case for rejecting in-
ventory valuation based on LIFO except that portion of the decision
which holds that a reserve to account for difference in value due
to change from FIFO to LIFO may be added to the tax base. The
decision in the Standard Oil case could have been sustained on
that argument alone, thus that case may be distinguished from the
principal case.
There is a substantive right to use LIFO for purposes of the
Ohio franchise tax but certain procedures should be followed in
its use. If an adjustment reserve is to be set up (as in Standard Oil
case) include the reserve in the tax base but submit a fair value
claim with the return. OHIo REV. CODE § 5733.05 (D) (5498). This
statute requiring claim to be filed with the annual corporation re-
port is mandatory and reduction to claimed fair value allowable
only upon timely filing of claim. Jacob B. Perkins v. Glander, 153
Ohio St. 501, 92 N.E. 2d 690 (1950). The simplest procedure is that
followed in the principal case. Upon change to LIFO state inventory
on books as valued by that method; do not set up a reserve account
to reflect difference due to change in valuation, such information
if desired can be kept apart from books of account. Should some
adjusting entry creating a reserve during fiscal year of change to
LIFO be necessary, include this reserve in tax base and submit a
fair value claim.
Donald W. Wiper, Jr.
STATE TAXATION - RETAIL SATLs TAX -
EXEMPTION OF SALE OF FOOD FOR CONSUMPTION
OFF PREMISES WHERE SOLD
Taxpayer, a concessionaire, sold food and refreshments from
booths at a municipal stadium and by itinerant vendors who went
through the crowd. The customers made purchases at the counters
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and then walked away, usually consuming the products on the way
to their seats in the stadium. Taxpayer had no control over the con-
courses, seats, runways or over any other portion of the stadium,
nor over who could enter the stadium. When taxpayer failed to list
the items for purposes of the retail sales tax, the Tax Commissioner
ordered two assessments against it and denied an application for the
refund of sales tax previously collected. The Ohio Board of Tax
Appeals affirmed the orders and taxpayer appealed to the Supreme
Court. Held, reversed, such sales of food and refreshment from
booths and by itinerant vendors in the stadium were sales off the
premises where sold and, therefore, not taxable under Omo CONST.
Art. XII, § 12 and OHIo REv. CODE § 5739.02 (5546). Cleveland Con-
cession Co. v. Peck, 159 Ohio St. 480, 112 N.E. 2d 529 (1953).
The Retail Sales Tax may not be levied on the sale of food for
human consumption off the premises where sold. OMo CONST. Art.
XII, § 12. The test is whether the food was sold for consumption
off the premises rather than whether it was actually consumed
off the premises. Anast and Finkler v. Evatt, Ohio B.T.A., No. 7799.
In the few cases interpreting the meaning of "premises where
sold" two different theories have been developed. One, a metes
and bounds argument, says that the phrase "premises where sold"
includes the entire building, large or small, where sales of food
products are consummated. Opposing this is the control argument,
which views "premises where sold" as that portion of the building,
structure, enclosure or other area where sales of food are made,
which is in the actual possession or control of the vendor. The
control theory was followed in deciding that the sales of packaged
milk by a dairy through vending machines in an industrial plant
over which the vendor exercised no control except the right of
ingress and egress to service the machines were sales "off premises
where sold" and, therefore, were not taxable. Castleberry v. Evatt,
147 Ohio St. 30, 67 N.E. 2d 861, 167 A.L.R. 198, (1946), C.C.H.
STATE TAx REPORTER, 1 60-237 and 60-238.
A California case, in interpreting that state's statute, which is
similar to the Ohio statute, held that sales from concession booths
at an exposition constituted sales off the premises. The control of
the grounds and the buildings in which the concessionaire operated
was limited to and confined within the limits of the concession
booth space although he had the privilege of selling food and re-
freshments on the grounds and in the buildings. Treasure Island
Catering Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 19 Cal. 2d 181, 120 P.
2d 1 (1941).
The Ohio Board of Tax Appeals has decided that the sale of
custard cones made by the vendor from two booths was not subject
to sales tax. The board pointed out that if the vendors had desired
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to serve their products for consumption on the premises they likely
would have provided seats and tables. The concessionaire had no
control over the sidewalk that was placed there for the use of the
general public and not merely for the accommodation of his cus-
tomers. Anast and Finkler v. Evatt, supra.
On somewhat different facts, the same board decided that food
sold to employees in their plant while on the job from trucks or
carts pushed down the aisles was off the premises and, therefore,
not taxable because the appellant concessionaire had no control
over the premises except the minute right of selling in the factory.
Peter's Cafeteria Inc. v. Glander, 72 N.E. 2d 688, 35 Ohio Op. 156,
Ohio B.T.A., No. 10902. The principal case is similar to the Peter's
Cafeteria case because the appellant did not exercise any control
over the concourses or any other area where the patrons consumed
their food.
These cases show that the basic test in interpreting the phrase
"premises where sold" is whether there is actual control over more
than the mere area where the concession booth is situated. The
stadium is for the accommodation of the general public, and the
sale of food is just an incidental convenience for the spectators. The
limited, exclusive vending privilege falls far short of indicating
sufficient control to render sales anywhere within the stadium as
"on the premises" for the purposes of sales tax.
The metes and bounds test, if extended, could produce absurd
results. For example, sales of food to tenants of an apartment build-
ing where the vendor's store is located might be subject to sales
tax under the metes and bounds test, since such sales would be
consumed within the boundaries of the premises where made. Also
taxation of sales of food made from a booth located on land used
as a trailer camp to customers living in trailers within the enclos-
ure, or sales of food to persons in a train station from a booth which
does not have chairs or tables and which has no control over the
rest of the station are examples of the absurdity that might be
reached. Castleberry v. Evatt, supra.
Thus, the principal case follows the control theory developed
in similar Ohio cases. One advantage is the prevention of admini-
strative difficulties which would arise in the concession business
due to the exemption of sales less than forty cents. Oino REV. CODE,
§ 5732.02 (5546-2). The disadvantage of the control theory is the
possible loss of revenue to the state. However, the control test
seems to be the most just and equitable solution yet devised.
Thor G. Ronemus
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TORTS - Loss OF CONSORTIum - ACTION BY WIFE
Plaintiff wife brought an action for loss of consortium of her
husband, allegedly the result of personal injuries sustained through
the defendant's negligence. Held, reversing the trial court's dis-
missal, that the action could be maintained. Brown v. Georgia-
Tennessee Coaches Inc., 88 Ga. App. -, 77 S.E. 2d 24 (1953).
The Supreme Court of Ohio has stated that "within the legal
meaning of consortium there was included not only affection, solace,
comfort, companionship and society incidental to the marital re-
lation, but also the services of the wife." Smith v. Nicholas Bldg.
Co., 93 Ohio St. 101, 112 N.E. 204 (1915). At other times its scope
has been delimited so as to subsume only the sentimental side
of the connubial relationship, as distinguished from services of a
practical nature. Kelly v. Bouche, 21 Ohio Op. 244 (1941); Flander-
meyer v. Cooper, 85 Ohio St. 327, 98 N.E. 102 (1911).
At common law a husband could recover from a negligent de-
fendant who had impaired the consortium of his wife. Smith v.
Nicholas Bldg. Co., supra; Hitaffer v. Argonne Company, Inc., 87
U. S. App. D.C. 57, 183 F. 2d 811, 23 A.L.R. 2d 1366 (1950). But this
had been universally denied to the wife. Courts have so held de-
spite the almost unanimity of legal writers in favor of allowing it.
See Note, 23 A.L.R. 2d 1380 (1952). Lippman, The Breakdown of
Consortium, 30 COL. L. REv. 651; Holbrook, The Change in the
Meaning of Consortium, 22 Mic. L. REv. 1; PRossER, TORTs § 102
(1941). It was not until 1950 that any court dared to diverge from
the solid majority. Hitaffer v. Argonne Company, Inc., supra. The
instant case was one of the first to follow its example.
Various justifications have been adduced for withholding from
the wife the right to maintain this action. Ohio decided the identical
issue against the wife in 1915. Smith v. Nicholas Bldg. Co., supra.
The court reasoned that the loss of services constituted the gist
of the action where the injury complained of was due to negli-
gence. No negligence case had been called to its attention that
permitted a husband to recover for loss of consortium unaccom-
panied by a claim for loss of services. Since the wife does not have
the legal right to the services of her husband, she cannot claim
damages as a result of the loss of such services. The completion
of this syllogism renders the conclusion that she cannot recover
for loss of consortium in negligence cases. A claim for loss of con-
sortium must be attendant to, and ancillary to, a claim for loss
of services. Or, if services are regarded as a component part of
consortium, this component part must be damaged before recom-
pense will be granted for injuries to any of the other component
parts. This is the rule presently espoused by Ohio. Kelly v. Bouche,
supra.
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The rationale of Ohio's position was persuasively rebutted in
the case of Hitaffer v. Argonne Company, Inc. supra. A husband
can recover for loss of consortium if the wife's injury was brought
about by the defendant's intentional and malicious act, basing his
claim solely upon an alienation of affection. Holtz v. Dick, 42 Ohio
St. 23 (1884); Smith v. Lyon, 9 Ohio App. 141 (1918). In effect,
the same injury- to wit, one confined to the sentimental side of
the conjugal relationship- is recompensed without showing loss
of services if the injury was intentional, while it is not actionable
by itself if it resulted from negligence. The soundness of this posi-
tion is dubious.
Another justification raised by the .court for this dichotomous
disposition of an identical injury is that the retribution for loss
of love and affection, in the case of malice, is in the nature of
punitive damages. But the force of this argument evanesces upon
close scrutiny, for exemplary damages cannot be grounded upon
an injury that would not be actionable if the claim for exemplary
damages were omitted. Schumacher v. Siefert, 35 Ohio App. 405,
172 N.E. 420 (1930); McCowm=cK, DAMAGES, § 83 (1935).
The Ohio court buttressed its decision by still another inef-
fectual prop. It felt that damages to marital rapport were too re-
mote, not the proximate result of the defendant's negligence. This
argument can be summarily dismissed, for it is fatally weakened
by the fact that a husband is permitted to recover under the same
circumstances.
Ohio, then, is committed to the tenuous proposition that loss
of consortium is not actionable in the absence of a concomitant
actionable loss of services, or, if you please, that loss of services is
the key to recovery for loss of any other right included within
the ambits of consortium. Smith v. Nicholas Bldg. Co., supra; Kelly
v. Bouche, supra; Curry v. Board of Commissioners of Franklin
County, 135 Ohio St. 435, 21 N.E. 2d 341 (1939). Precluding the
wife from recovery, while permitting the husband redress, amounts
to invidious discrimination that cannot meet the tests of logic and
justice. There is no reason why a diligent presentation of the argu-
ments mentioned here could not effect a change in Ohio's present
position, for it is quite obviously vulnerable to multi-lateral attack.
David G. Sherman
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